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SCALIA ON ABORTION: ORIGINALISM . . . BUT, WHY? 
Robert Cassidy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s rulings on abortion were, he always 
argued, grounded on his Originalist adherence to the Constitution, not 
his personal feelings or religious beliefs.  Whether basing his judg-
ments on the intent of the Founders in writing the text (as in early de-
cisions), or on the ordinary meaning of the text for the late 18th centu-
ry public (as in later decisions), Scalia always professed a devout 
obedience to the fixed meaning of the Constitution, as though it were 
a judicial Word of God.1 
But, the Constitution was not, of course, taken by him as liter-
ally divine revelation.  And that raises the question that is the focus of 
this examination of his juridical faith: Why should words written over 
200 years ago in a radically different culture still bind our contempo-
rary courts?  To put it briefly, “Why Originalism?” 
This attempt to answer that question will focus on Scalia’s 
Supreme Court opinions on abortion, while complementing this with 
some of his other opinions, as well as his frequent extra-juridical pro-
nouncements expressing his rationales for giving such constraining 
power to our country’s original rules. 
 
* Robert Cassidy is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law 
Center. He has been for the last twenty years the Director of Bioethics and Social Policy at 
Schneider Children’s Hospital and Long Island Jewish Medical Center. He also served as a 
Professor of Family Medicine and Director of Clinical Ethics at the Robert Wood Johnson 
Medical School, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. He is the author of 
many articles and book chapters on medical ethics and the recipient of numerous grants and 
awards for his teaching and research. He received a B.A., with highest honors, Phi Beta 
Kappa from Williams College, and his M.A. and Ph.D. in Philosophy of Religion from 
Princeton University. 
1 Antonin Scalia, address at the University of Chicago Law School (Sept. 16, 1986); See 
BRUCE MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE 109-11 (2015); see also Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
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I shall argue that his rationales are grounded on two determi-
native ethical imperatives: Consequentialism, i.e., the right action is 
that which will produce the better balance of beneficial consequences 
over harmful consequences;2 and Contractualism, i.e., the right action 
is that which we are bound by duty to carry out.3  To put it another 
way, he finds the answer to why he, as a  Supreme Court jurist should 
obey the “original Constitution,” by looking in two complementary 
directions: As a Consequentialist, he looks to the future, and calcu-
lates the balance of benefits over harms from having an unchangeable 
written ordering of our governing rules.  Only with such an absolute 
rule book will our society have the order, unity and continuity neces-
sary for a stable society.  And, as a Contractualist, he looks to the 
past, to the binding oath he took to preserve and defend the Constitu-
tion-as-written.  This, he believes, preempts his right (and all proper 
jurists) to substitute his own views and values.  For Scalia, these two 
defining ethical imperatives demand that the recent Supreme Court’s 
judicial creation of a purported Right to Abortion be overturned. 
II. OPINIONS ON ABORTION 
A. Roe v. Wade4 
While Scalia did not join the Court until 13 years after Roe v. 
Wade was decided, it was the focal target for his attacks on the judi-
cial activism which created a constitutionally protected right to abor-
tion.5  Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion, found a 
woman’s right to abortion in the “Right to Privacy” that Justice 
Douglas had discovered in the “penumbra of the Constitution” in the 
contraceptive case, Griswold v. Connecticut.6  For Blackmun this 
right was ultimately grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s con-
 
2 Consequentialism, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/conseque/ (last visited May 24, 2016). 
3 Contractualism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/ (last visited May 24, 2016). 
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
5 See id.; see also Justice Antonin Scalia, THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history-of-the-court/the-current-court/justice-antonin-
scalia/ (last visited May 24, 2016). 
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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cept of personal liberty.7  In what might be called “Inspirational 
Originalism,” the majority in both cases judged that such a right was 
implicit in the spirit of the Constitution.8  Time after time Scalia ob-
jected to what he regarded as this subjective creating of new law, and 
counter-attacked with his “Textual Originalism,” as in a speech in 
2002: “My difficulty with Roe v. Wade is a legal rather than a moral 
one. I do not believe—and no one believed for 200 years—that the 
Constitution contains a right to abortion.”9  The basis for this charge 
was, of course, that there was nothing in the text of the Constitution 
(or in the two centuries of Supreme Court judgments) to ground a 
claim to such a purported right. Without an explicit license from the 
text or the tradition, justices should claim no judicial license to fabri-
cate such a new right.  His moral Contractualism demands that as of-
ficers of the court and obedient servants of the Law, judges are bound 
by an “enduring contract.”10  And that constitutional contract, he pro-
claims, which does not mention an abortion right, gives the “federal 
government and, hence me, no power over the matter.”11 
His major criticism of Roe, and all the subsequent pro-
abortion decisions, builds on this point: The Constitution, by not ex-
plicitly empowering the federal government with authority to rule on 
this issue, has reserved that power to be exercised by the democratic 
processes of the various legislatures, which must, therefore, be re-
spected by the nine unelected justices of the Court. 
B. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services12 
A Missouri law had declared that life begins at conception, 
and therefore fetal life required legal protection by restricting access 
to abortion.13  Specifically, it prohibited public employees and facili-
ties from participating in non-life threatening abortions, and prohibit-
ed abortions after twenty weeks, unless the fetus was determined to 
 
7 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
8 Id. at 150. 
9 Session Three: Religion, Politics and the Death Penalty, PEWRESEARCHCENTER (Jan. 25, 
2002), http://www.pewforum.org/2002/01/25/session-three-religion-politics-and-the-death-
penalty/. 
10 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855-56 (1989). 
11 Id. 
12 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
13 Id. 
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be not viable.14  Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion diluted Roe’s 
strict scrutiny test of abortion restrictions;15 and O’Connor’s concur-
ring opinion introduced an alternative, the “Undue Burden Test,” to 
judge such restrictions.16 
Scalia chastised the Court for not having the courage to com-
pletely overturn Roe, prolonging what he labeled its “self-awarded 
sovereignty.”17  But, his major objection is a pragmatic Consequen-
tialist judgment that this will prolong the public controversy, thereby 
disrupting the nation and imposing enormous pressure on the Court to 
become not the servant of the law but of the tides of popular opinion.  
And, with prophetic acuity, he warned that justices would inevitably 
become merely the instruments of the political parties. 
A year later in another opinion requiring either two parent no-
tification or a judicial by-pass for a minor, Scalia strenuously object-
ed to the Court’s cacophony of partially concurring and partially dis-
senting judgments.18  Again he vehemently protested about both the 
constitutionally unauthorized arrogation of such self-anointed author-
ity to create an “Abortion Code,” and also the legal anarchy that 
would be caused by the absence of any objective grounds for resolv-
ing arguments over these intensely held opinions.19 
C. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey20 
The Court in Casey reviewed a Pennsylvania abortion law 
that required parental notification, a twenty-four hour waiting period 
and spousal notification.21  Here, much to Scalia’s indignation, the 
Court continued to inflict a “death by a 1000 qualifications” on Roe, 
but was not quite willing to apply the coup de grace.  Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion eliminated Roe’s trimester scheme for 
controlling abortion restrictions and made the “Undue Burden” test 
 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 546-48 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
17 See supra note 5. 
18 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). 
19 Id. 
20 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
21 Id. at 833. 
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the official standard.22  The Court then rejected spousal notification 
as not passing the new test.23  But, the majority could not bring them-
selves to forthrightly overturn Roe, justifying this tepid stare decisis 
on the Consequentialist grounds that society had had almost 20 years 
of being ruled by Roe, and that radical change in society’s established 
order undermined the protection of all individual rights.24  As 
O’Connor intoned in the opening sentence of her opinion, “Liberty 
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”25 
In his dissent, Scalia was, of course, outraged at this latest ex-
ercise of “The Imperial Judiciary . . . .”26  He proclaimed the Court’s 
duty to step aside and let the democratically elected legislatures de-
cide such strongly held and conflicted issues.  Not only did this fulfill 
the obligation of officers of the court to follow the letter of the law 
“based on text and tradition,”27 but it would also produce the best so-
cietal consequences respecting the diversity of views and values in 
the land, and giving all participants, “even the loser, the satisfaction 
of a fair hearing and an honest fight.”28  Summing up his Contractual-
ist and Consequentialist arguments, he wrote: We should get out of 
this area, where we have no right to be, and where we do neither our-
selves nor the country any good by remaining.29 
III. SUMMARY 
Justice Scalia constantly insisted that his own personal views 
and values played no part when he assumed the responsibilities of a 
judge.  Indeed, he asserted that he would not vote to invalidate either 
a state law restricting abortion or one permitting abortion on de-
mand.30  Rather, he claimed that his rulings were preemptively de-
termined by the text of the Constitution, which gave no authority over 
this issue to the Court.  The two grounds for this view, as he argued 
in numerous opinions and speeches, were first that his (and all judg-
es’) duty to follow obediently the Constitution as written.  This Con-
 
22 Id. at 837. 
23 Id. at 837-38. 
24 Id. at 846-88. 
25 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 844 (1992). 
26 Id. at 995 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
27 Id. at 999. 
28 Id. at 996. 
29 Id. at 1002. 
30 See supra note 5. 
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tractualist argument was complemented by his strong Consequential-
ist concern about the dire harm if judges’ own diverse and shifting 
values were allowed to constantly remake the law of the land in their 
own images.  Such judicial subjectivism would undermine the essen-
tial continuity and unity that a civil society needs in order to endure. 
For Justice Scalia, his oft proclaimed adherence to the original text of 
the Constitution was demanded by both his sense of being duty-
bound to follow the letter of the law, and also by his social utilitarian 
belief in the need for a grounding authority from the nation’s past to 
preserve and protect its future. 
IV. FINAL NOTE 
It is most striking after this survey of Justice Scalia’s opinions 
that, with only one exception (the “shudder of revulsion” he felt for 
partial birth abortion), he makes no comments about the rightness or 
wrongness of abortion.31  He does not express his own moral judg-
ments of a woman’s rights to reproductive choice, nor of the rights of 
the fetus to life.  This he tells us repeatedly is not the job of the judge.  
With clear parallels to the Separation Theory of Justice Holmes, he 
does not describe his job as doing justice (or advocating any other 
moral values), but rather of devoutly applying the law.32  Critics, of 
course, have claimed that “his law” and the theories that ground it are 
covertly shaped by his personal moral values.  But, on the record, 
Justice Scalia insists that, to borrow another metaphor, he is only an 
umpire: He should not make the rules. He must only apply them. 
 
 
31 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 954 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
32 FREDRICK R. KELLOGG, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., LEGAL THEORY, AND JUDICIAL 
RESTRAINT (2011). 
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